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PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ORDERING IN
SAFE ASSET MARKETS
Anna Gelpern* and Erik F. Gerding*
INTRODUCTION
At the center of global financial markets lies a myth: investors, financial
intermediaries, and governments treat trillions of dollars of debt contracts as
risk free.' Indeed, participants in financial markets have seemingly bought
into a collective assumption that a subset of debt contracts-which has
included at various times sovereign bonds, bank debt, investment-grade
bonds, asset-backed securities, repurchase agreements (repos), and money
market mutual funds-would always be paid in full and on time.2 This
collective assumption, in turn, has several remarkable consequences. It
enables the debt contracts to trade at par, endows the markets for them with
liquidity, and allows them to be used as basic building blocks in financial
engineering. Financial intermediaries use forms of debt assumed to be risk
free as critical ingredients in complex financial transactions, including the
alchemical creation of other forms of "safe" debt.'
The collective assumption that any debt is risk free can prove disastrously
wrong. In the global financial crisis, risk rematerialized in a succession of
apparently safe asset markets. Investors in asset-backed securities, bank debt,
money market mutual funds, repos, and even some sovereign debt triggered
runs, fire sales, and market freezes. Safety had evaporated suddenly and
cataclysmically.
An influential and growing literature has explored this phenomenon of
"safe assets"-when participants across financial markets act "as if" certain
debt is risk free-and its role in the global financial crisis, as well as its
implications for post-crisis reform.' This literature breaks into two broad
strands. One strand focuses on the macroeconomic sources and consequences

* Anna Gelpern is a Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center and a
nonresident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.
** Erik F. Gerding is a Professor of Law and the Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at
the University of Colorado Law School. We are grateful to Ted Janger, Mark Roe, participants
in this symposium and editors of the Brooklyn Journalof Corporate, Financial& Commercial
Law for comments on earlier drafts, and to Nicholas Brock for research assistance. Portions of
this Article are adapted from companion pieces in the Yale Journal on Regulation and
RECONCEPTUALISING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS REGULATION, cited below.

1. Anna Gelpern & Erik F. Gerding, Inside Safe Assets, YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2016)

[hereinafter Gelpern & Gerding, Inside Safe Assets].
2. Anna Gelpern & Erik F. Gerding, Rethinking the Law in 'Safe Assets', in
RECONCEPTUALISING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS REGULATION (Ross P. Buckley et al. eds.,

forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter Gelpem & Gerding, Rethinking the Law].
3. Gelpern & Gerding, Inside Safe Assets, supra note 1.
4. See IMF, Global FinancialStability Report: The Quest for Lasting Stability 81 (2012)
[hereinafter IMF GFSR].
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of global demand for safe assets.' The second emphasizes safe assets as a
necessary ingredient in financial market transactions.' Both strands view safe
asset production as a function of economic and financial market forces. Both
relegate law and regulation to the margins of the safe assets story.
We have argued to the contrary: that laws and regulations play central
roles in constructing safe asset markets.' We have traced how regulation
helps create the demand and supply for sovereign debt, bank debt, repos, and
asset-backed securities.' We have also examined the implications for
financial reform of this central role of law and regulation in safe asset
markets. 9
In this Article, we highlight the role of private ordering in constructing
safe assets. Private ordering-including a battery of contractual devices and
transaction structures-contributes to the creation of these debt contracts, to
their collective treatment in financial markets as low risk investments, and to
the making of deep and liquid markets in them. These contracts and
transaction structures, in turn, provide a template for understanding the role
of government regulation in constructing safe asset markets. Using this
template, we explore both private and public ordering in safe asset markets.
We reiterate our view that safe asset supply and demand does not occur
organically, in a vacuum, or in a state of nature. Rather, whether through
private or public ordering, three types of legal tools operate to construct safe
assets:
1. Making Assets Safe: one set of tools regulates the production of safe
assets by regulating the cash flows into and out of an issuer of safe assets to
increase the likelihood of full and prompt payment to investors. These
"making" tools might take the form of:
T engineering the asset side of an issuer's balance sheet to reduce the
risk of inputs in safe assets;
T engineering the liability side of an issuer's balance sheet to give
holders of safe assets priority over other claimants on the issuer; or
5. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke et al., InternationalCapitalFlows and the Returns to Safe Assets

in the United States, 2003-2007 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Int'l Fin. Discussion
Paper No. 1014, 2011), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2011/1014/ifdpl014.pdf; Ricardo
J. Caballero, The "Other" Imbalance and the FinancialCrisis (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,

Working Paper No. 15636, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl5636; Ricardo J. Caballero et al.,
An Equilibrium Model of "Global Imbalances" and Low Interest Rates, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 358
(2008); Ricardo J. Caballero & Arvind Krishnamurthy, Global Imbalances and Fiscal Fragility

(Nat'l
Bureau
of Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
14688,
2009),
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl4688; Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas & Olivier Jeanne, Global Safe
Assets 53
(Bank for
Int'l
Settlements, Working Paper
No. 399, 2012),
http://www.bis.org/publ/work399.pdf.
6. See, e.g., Gary Gorton et al., The Saft-Asset Share, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 101 (2012); Tri Vi
Dang et al., Ignorance, Debt and Financial Crises (Mar. 11, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.columbia.edu/-td2332/Paper-Ignorance.pdf
7. Gelpern & Gerding, Inside Safe Assets, supra note 1.
8. Gelpem & Gerding, Rethinking the Law, supra note 2.
9. Gelpern & Gerding, Inside Safe Assets, supra note 1.
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creating and regulating the secondary market for safe assets.
2. Labeling Assets Safe: another set of legal tools focuses on the demand
for safe assets by granting special status to these contracts when held on the
books of investors. These tools create liquid markets for certain assets by
either:
¶ signaling the low risk of default by issuers of those assets; or
¶ coordinating the collective treatment of those assets as having low

risk and high liquidity.
3. GuaranteeingAsset Safety: financial intermediaries and governments
can also guarantee the performance of safe assets, putting their own credit on
the line. Guarantees may be ex ante or ex post, explicit or implicit.
A comparison of private and public ordering in safe asset markets reveals
how difficult it is to separate the two. Indeed, much of private ordering relies
on statute and regulation. It assumes and operates against a backdrop of
government intervention. Public ordering succeeds at creating safe assets
when it enables private ordering and herding by investors into safe asset
markets. Understanding this complex interplay between public and private
tools becomes vital for understanding how safe asset markets operate, how
they fail, and how they must be reformed.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II examines how private
ordering-contractual devices and transaction structures-fosters safe asset
markets using the three-tool template just described. It uses securitization as
an example for understanding private ordering in other safe asset markets.
Part III outlines public ordering in safe asset markets. The Article concludes
with two lessons. First, it deconstructs the notion that there is purely private
or public ordering in safe asset markets. Second, it underscores a kind of first
law of thermodynamics for safe assets: neither private nor public ordering
can banish risk altogether from safe asset markets or financial markets in
general. They merely move risk around or, worse, obscure risk until it
rematerializes.
II. PRIVATE ORDERING
Making, labeling, and guarantees are familiar tools in private ordering.
Asset securitization provides an example of how those who structure
securitizations deploy all three tools to create investment-grade asset-backed
securities. This Part provides a very rough sketch of these tools at work in
securitization, which serves as a template for understanding how the tools
work in constructing other safe assets. After Parts II.A, B, and C map making,
labeling, and guarantees in securitization, Part II.D telescopes outward to
draw the analogy between private ordering in asset-backed securities and
private ordering in safe asset markets in general.
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A. MAKING SAFER SECURITIES
Market participants can use contracts and transaction structures to make
certain debt contracts retain their value and liquidity under different
circumstances-even in the face of economic shocks. This private ordering
works on three different levels. First, contracts and transaction structures
regulate the inputs in securitization vehicles. Second, contracts and structures
regulate the outputs (asset-backed securities) to give those securities higher
priority claims on the issuer's cash flows than the issuer's other debts. Third,
market participants can create institutions (including trading and clearing
companies) and impose trading rules to create deeper and more liquid
secondary markets in asset-backed securities. We examine each of these three
categories of private ordering tools in turn. Figure 1 below provides a
schematic of where each of these types of private ordering tools operates in
the assembly line for manufacturing asset-backed securities.
Figure 1
(1)
Regulation
of Inputs

Mortgages,
Loans

4

(2)
Regulation
of Outputs

Securitization
Vehicle

-

Assetbacked
Securities
(senior
and subordinated)

4

Investors

-

(3) Regulation of
Secondary Markets

Secondary
Market
Investors
1.

Inputs: Fortifying Issuers

Contractual devices and transaction structures regulate the inputs into a
securitization vehicle to ensure that senior asset-backed securities retain their
value under different conditions. In essence, these devices and structures
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engineer the asset side of the securitization vehicle's balance sheet. They
include the following:
Activity Restrictions. Securitization vehicles are special purpose entities
(SPEs) that are contractually restricted from engaging in all but a limited
range of activities.'o
Regulating the Riskiness ofPurchasedAssets. The foundational contracts
that govern a securitization transaction, including Pooling and Servicing
Agreements and Indentures, regulate the types of risky assets that
securitization vehicles may buy and hold. Some of these restrictions are
designed to ensure a minimum creditworthiness of the borrowers under the
mortgages or other loans being fed into the securitization. This reduces the
credit risk that the SPE takes on.'' Other restrictions dictate the terms of
purchased loans and may work to limit interest rate risk on asset-backed
securities that the SPE issues." Originators often make representations and
warranties that assets sold into a securitization meet certain defined criteria
and agree to repurchase assets that are later revealed to violate these
standards." Some specialized variations of securitization, such as assetbacked commercial paper (ABCP), may also have contractual requirements
that the SPE purchase only highly liquid assets to mitigate the risks associated
with an asset-liability mismatch.' 4
Pooling. Some of the most important mechanisms for regulating the asset
side of the SPE balance sheet are contractual requirements that the SPE hold
a diversified pool of loans.'" For example, in mortgage securitization, the
SPE is typically required by contract to buy mortgage loans from a range of
geographic regions.'" Diversification protects the vehicle and its investors

10. See William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A TransactionalGenealogy ofScandal: From
Michael Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 783, 836 (2013).
11. ADAM B. ASHCRAFT & TIL SCHUERMANN, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y., STAFF REP. No. 318,
UNDERSTANDING

THE SECURITIZATION

OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CREDIT (2008) (discussing

underwriting standards in mortgage-backed securities).
12. See Alan C. Hess & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Elements of MortgageSecuritization, I J. REAL
EST. FIN. & ECON. 331 (1988) (describing interest rate risk in mortgage securitization); Dwight M.
Jaffee, The Interest Rate Risk ofFannieMaeand FreddieMac, 24 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 5 (2008). Cf
KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. McCoy, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT,

REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS (2011) (describing how the failure of securitization to
exclude mortgages that subjected borrowers to interest rate resets and payment shocks led to losses
on mortgage-backed securities).

13. See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LISSA L. BROOME, SECURITIZATION,
STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS (2004).
14. See SWASI BATE, STEPHANY BUSHWELLER & EVERETT RUTAN, MOODY'S INVESTORS
SERVICE, SPECIAL REPORT, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF ASSET-BACKED COMMERCIAL PAPER 6-7
(2003), https://www.imf.org/extemal/np/seminars/eng/2010/mcm/pdf/Rutanl.pdf.
15. BOND MKT. ASS'N ET AL., SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES (SPEs) AND THE SECURITIZATION

MARKETS 2-3 (2002), http://www.isda.org/speeches/pdf/SPV-Discussion-Piece-Final-Feb01.pdf.
16. See John Cotter et al., Can Housing Risk Be Diversified? A Cautionary Tale from the
Housing Boom and Bust, 28 REV. FIN. STUDS. 913 (2015).
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from concentration risk (e.g., the risk that a regional downturn might cause
borrowers in a particular region to default en masse).'"
Protection from Bankruptcy (Assets). Securitization vehicles are
designed to be "bankruptcy remote." This means, among other things, that
the loans owned by the SPE must be insulated from the risk of repossession
that might ordinarily follow from the bankruptcy of the original lender. To
shield SPE assets, securitization contracts are written to ensure that the asset
transfer from the original lender to the securitization vehicle is a "true sale,"
so that the original lender has no part of the risk or reward associated with
the original loans."
Agency Cost Protections. Many parties act on behalf of securitization
vehicles, which themselves can do nothing but buy, sell, and hold assets.
These agents include servicers, who collect principal and interest on
underlying assets and enforce a vehicle's rights on those assets, and collateral
managers, who manage the assets in a securitization vehicle's portfolio. The
use of these agents brings agency costs, which the securitization vehicle
manages through covenants and compensation structures to align the interests
of agents with SPE investors.
The foregoing sampling of tools illustrates how private orderingcontract and transactional techniques--can help manage the assets of a
securitization vehicle to ensure full and timely payments on its asset-backed
securities, so that investors can treat these securities as "safe."
2. Outputs: Reordering Liabilities
Private ordering also works on the liability side of the securitization
vehicle's balance sheet to grant certain asset-backed securities-the safe
assets-priority to the cash flows coming into the issuer. A number of
devices create and preserve these priorities including:
Capital Structure: Tranching, and Payment Waterfalls. Securitization
vehicles often issue multiple classes (tranches) of securities. The indenture
that governs the terms of asset-backed securities typically includes
"waterfall" provisions that specify that senior securities receive interest and
principal payments before more junior securities receive anything." These
are often reinforced by dedicated reserve accounts for senior asset-backed
securities. Payments on underlying assets go first to holders of senior assetbacked securities and then to a reserve account, which must maintain a certain
balance before payments are made on junior securities.20

17. See id.
18. Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: The Workout
Prohibitionin ResidentialMortgage-BackedSecurities, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 1075, 1094 (2009).

19.

BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REPORT ON

SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES 49 (2009), http://www.bis.org/publ/joint23.pdf

20. Id. at 90-91.
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Payments on senior asset-backed securities are also protected by excess
interest spread and overcollateralization structures. Excess spread means that
interest rates on the underlying collateral exceed the interest rates on the
securities. 21 Overcollateralization means that the face amount of collateral
exceeds the principal amount of the senior securities it backs.22
Tranching, waterfalls, reserve accounts, excess spread, and
overcollateralization individually and collectively function like a capital
cushion that protects the most senior asset-backed securities issued by the
SPE. Losses on underlying assets affect subordinated tranches first.
Theoretically, only extreme losses should impact the repayment of principal
and interest on the senior securities-would-be safe assets-at the top of the
capital structure.
Protection from Bankruptcy (Liabilities). While "true sale" contract
techniques shield SPE assets from the effects of an original lender's
bankruptcy, corporate organization techniques shield the debts of the SPE
(asset-backed securities) from being rewritten or discharged should the SPE
become insolvent. 23 To prevent ex post contract modification, SPEs are
typically established as trusts, which, under the Bankruptcy Code, cannot file
for bankruptcy. 24
Other structural features reduce the risk of default on certain kinds of
asset-backed securities. For example, ABCP has short maturities, which give
it effective priority over longer-term debt. Such structural subordination of
other debt allows investors in ABCP to protect themselves against risk by
giving them the option to get paid as soon as they feel insecure, or to roll over
their exposure.
3.

Secondary Market Liquidity

Securitization sponsors also use private ordering to create a secondary
trading market for senior asset-backed securities. Techniques include having
the securities trade in book entry form, making clearing and settlement
services available for trades, and even listing the securities on specialized
exchanges.25 Clearing companies, in turn, impose various rules, such as

21. Id. at 72.
22. Id. at 50.

23. Id.
24. Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 18, at 1094 n.72 (citing II U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012), which
enumerates entities eligible to file for bankruptcy; business trusts are not among the eligible
entities).
25. Pre-crisis, Luxembourg or Dublin listings were popular for certain kinds of asset-backed
securities. See John M. Brown, The Irish Stock Exchange's Special Role, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2004,
2:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/1/f4b307a4-312c- I d9-a595-00000e251I c8.html#axzz
3n9prYrFV.
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margin requirements and position limits, to mitigate their counterparty
exposure to traders.26
Investment banks might also conduct market making and market
stabilization activities for the asset-backed securities issuances they
underwrite." These activities provide additional market liquidity, which can
be a critical attribute for safe assets. Some investment banks may take the
extra step of buying asset-backed securities for use as collateral in
resecuritizations, such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and reresecuritizations (CDO Squareds).
B. LABELING CLAIMS AS SAFE

Credit rating agencies rate claims on SPEs, reflecting the likelihood of
full and timely payoff.28 For other safe assets, credit ratings might assess the
creditworthiness of an issuer (such as a sovereign or a bank) or the repayment
risk of a particular issuance of debt.29 Investors may look to ratings of safe
assets in both primary and secondary markets.
An extensive legal literature examines how rating agencies function (or
fail to function effectively) as gatekeepers. This literature defines the
gatekeeping function in at least two different ways. One definition sees rating
agencies and other gatekeepers as reputational intermediaries who certify the
accuracy of an issuer's information.3 o A second definition focuses on
gatekeeper's ability to restrict issuer access to capital markets.'
These two definitions correspond to two different but related functions
that ratings perform for safe asset markets. First, investors may look to ratings
for information on the riskiness of a debt instrument. Ratings thus help
investors conserve on the search costs of finding and evaluating information
on investment risk. However, even if investors do not care about the
information provided by ratings, these devices may serve a second function:
26. See JON GREGORY, CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES: MANDATORY CENTRAL CLEARING AND
INITIAL MARGIN REQUIREMENTS FOR OTC DERIVATIVES 22 (2014).
27. See Reena Aggrwal, StabilizationActivities by UnderwritersAfter Initial Public Offerings,
55 J. FIN. 1075 (2000) (on post-underwriting stabilization).
28. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit Ratings, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES
AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 65 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002); Stephen Choi,
Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 916 (1998); Ben S. Bernanke et al., supra note
5.
29. See generally TOMASZ R. BIELECKI & MAREK RUTKOWSKI, CREDIT RISK: MODELING,
VALUATION AND HEDGING (2004).

30. This securities literature seeks to explain the role of intermediaries, such as accounting firms,

rating agencies, investment banks, law firms, and others. One group of scholars defined the role of
gatekeepers in terms of information certification. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding
Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid", 57 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1405 (2002) ("reputational

intermediaries ... provide verification and certification services to investors"); Choi, supra note 28,
at 918.
31. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement

Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986) (defining gatekeepers as "private parties who are able
to disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers").
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they provide a mechanism for investors to coordinate their investments. For
example, certain regulated firms may not invest in assets rated below
investment-grade, or must put aside extra capital for holding belowinvestment-grade assets. A rating change that pushes an asset to one or the
other side of a regulatory or contractual threshold might lead large groups of
investors to rush in or out of the asset. Ratings thus serve as a focal point for
investor herding, which can generate the liquidity that is all-important for
many safe assets.
Ratings have played a distinct role in asset-backed securities. SPEs are
designed to achieve a particular mix of ratings for the securities they issue,
so as to enable their sponsors to target investors in particular market
segments. The most senior claims are designed to function as safe assets and
appeal to the most risk-averse or regulatorily-constrained buyers.
C. GUARANTEEING PAYMENT
Investors in securitization often require third-party credit enhancement,
such as bond insurance or credit derivatives. Guarantees of senior assetbacked securities may take the form of bond insurance policies, often
packaged together with the securities upon their issuance, or credit
derivatives contracts, which might be purchased in connection with
secondary market transactions.3 2 In other safe asset markets, credit
enhancement takes the form of guarantees from affiliates of the issuer. 3
Guarantees may be implicit and ex post and not just explicit and issued
ex ante. For example, when ABCP markets froze in the 2007-2008 global
financial crisis, many sponsors of ABCP vehicles paid up to avoid investor
losses, despite having no legal obligation to do so.34 This illustrates moral or
implicit recourse at work. In addition to such implicit "moral support," ABCP
investors also enjoyed third-party liquidity guarantees, whereby financial
institutions would agree to provide short-term loans to an ABCP investment
vehicle to cover cash shortfalls that might occur because of the asset-liability
mismatch inherent in ABCP." Finally, the contractual obligations of
originators to buy back securitized mortgages or other loans that do not

32. See Ren6 M. Schultz, Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 15384, 2009), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl5384.pdf See also
Adam J. Levitin, The Tenuous Casefor DerivativesClearinghouses, 101 GEo. L.J. 445 (2013).
33. See, e.g., Markus K. Brunnermeier et al., European Safe Bonds 19 (Sept. 30, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.columbia.edu/-rr2572/papers/ 11 -ESBies.pdf.
34. Viral V. Acharya & Nada Mora, Are Banks PassiveLiquidity Backstops? Deposit Rates and
Flows during the 2007-2009 Crisis 12 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City Econ. Research Dep't,
Working
Paper
No.
11-06,
2011),
https://www.kansascityfed.org/-/media/files/publicat/reswkpap/pdf/rwpl 1-06.pdf.
35. Viral V. Acharya & Philipp Schnabl, Do Global Banks Spread Global Imbalances?AssetBacked Commercial Paper During the Financial Crisis of 2007-09, 58 IMF ECON. REV. 37, 68
(2010).
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comport with the originators' representations and warranties function as yet
another kind of guarantee.
D. PRIVATE ORDERING IN SAFE ASSETS, SUMMARIZED

Securitization serves as a model for understanding how making, labeling,
and guarantees operate in the private ordering of safe asset markets. As with
securitization vehicles, other safe asset issuers function as intermediaries that
convert riskier, less liquid assets into low-risk, liquid securities. Investors
then treat the most senior of these securities as virtually risk-free. Figure 2
below provides a roadmap for how private and public ordering in
securitization mirrors safe asset construction in other markets.
Figure 2

Liability Side of

Asset Side of
the Issuer's
Balance Sheet

the Issuer's
Balance Sheet
Safe Assets

Intermediary/Issuer

Risky Asset
Inputs

(and other
liabilities)

Mortgages,
Loans

Mortgages,
Loans

Bonds

4

4

Securitization
Vehicle

Senior Assetbacked Securities
(and subordinated
securities)

Bank

Deposits and
Other Bank Debt
(and bank
preferred and
common stock)

Money market
Mutual Fund

4

Money market
mutualfund shares

In these safe asset markets, contractual devices and transaction structures
similar to those used in securitization help make, label, and guarantee the
safety of safe assets. Figure 3 abstracts and illustrates this private safety
toolkit.
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Fi2ure 3: Private Ordering and the Safety Toolkit
Made Safe
* Contractual activity
restrictions (including
negative covenants)
* Contractual
restrictions on
riskiness of assets
issuer may purchase

Labeled Safe
* Credit

Guaranteed Safe
* Affiliate

rating
(of the issuer)

guarantees (ex
ante and ex post)
o Liquidity
support
* Credit
enhancement
* Credit derivatives
that pay out in the
event of issuer insolvency

* Senior/subordinated

Credit rating

Bond insurance

(of the safe
asset)

(Issuer's
Liabilities, or
Safe Assets)

liabilities (capital
structure, excess
spread)
* Collateral backs safe
assets (including
overcollateralization)
* Short maturities
* Restrictions on issuer
declaring bankruptcy

for safe assets
Credit derivatives
that pay out in the
event of safe
asset default

Credit ratings
in secondary
markets

Credit derivatives
markets (dealers)

Secondary
Markets

* Trading and clearing
platforms
* Platform rules to limit
counterparty risk
(margin, position
limits)
* Underwriter marketmaking activities

Inputs
(Issuer's
Assets)

Outputs

* Contractual
restrictions on
liquidity of assets
being purchased
* Pooling
* Bankruptcy remote
from originators
* Contractual restrictions on issuer's
agents
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Figure 3 does not try to describe the universe of private risk management
tools. Nor does it imply that the categories above are always discrete. Many
contractual devices, such as the repo obligations of loan originators, might
fall within more than one category. We also do not want to suggest that public
ordering is irrelevant to the tools above. In fact, to foreshadow one of our
conclusions, many private ordering tools, such as bankruptcy remoteness,
exist only because of important public ordering in the background (here,
bankruptcy legislation). The importance of other ostensibly private ordering
devices, such as credit rating agencies, is largely a function of regulatory
licenses that those devices enjoy. Nevertheless, the categories of private
.ordering sketched above help recast familiar transactional concepts in safe
asset terms, and set the stage for our discussion of public ordering.
III. PUBLIC ORDERING
The state can produce its own safe assets or make safe assets out of
private contracts. The public toolkit includes all the techniques available to
private actors, as well as the state's power to regulate, tax, and print money.
Nonetheless, the basic three-part structure of intervention is the same. The
state makes, labels, and guarantees the safety of financial contracts,
prompting market participants to treat them as if they were risk free.
A. MAKING

The state can engineer safe assets in three ways. First, it can use statutes
and regulations to make the issuers of safe assets "safe and sound"-that is,
solvent, liquid, and otherwise less risky. Some of this state intervention
affects the asset side of issuer balance sheets and allows the senior liabilities
of those institutions to become safe assets. Second, other legal rules prescribe
the liability side of the balance sheets: they create senior cash flows, which
allow investors to treat their claims on the issuer as safe assets. A third set of
rules governs the markets for safe assets, including the terms of the contracts
used by investors to buy and sell safe assets, such as margin regulations. All
of these rules promote full and timely repayment, stable prices, and trading
at par in multiple circumstances.
1. Inputs: Fortifying Institutions
Governments and private actors use similar tools to reduce the risk to
safe asset issuers, including regulations with close parallels to the private
contracts that:
¶ restrict the inputs/assets issuers may purchase to low risk
investments;
¶ restrict issuers to liquid investments;
¶ limit the activities in which issuers may engage; and

2015]

Private and Public Ordering in Safe Asset Markets

109

¶

'

govern the behavior of parties that sell assets to the issuer, as well as
the behavior of the issuer's agents.
Regulating Inputs/Investments: The best-known example of legal rules
that make institutions safe is bank balance sheet regulation. Bank assets and
liabilities are substantially prescribed by law to protect demand deposits. 6 A
similar approach is used for other financial intermediaries, such as money
market mutual funds. On the asset side, regulation promotes some
investments and restricts others, in each case in order to make all of the firm's
liabilities safer. For example, money market mutual funds in the United
States must maintain the market value of their assets within a very narrow
range.3 7 By statute and regulation, deposit-issuing banks may hold only
enumerated categories of assets consistent with the "business of banking," as
set out in statutes and interpreted by the regulators." Within this set,
regulation encourages banks to hold some assets over others. 39 At the limit,
scholars have argued that banks should hold cash reserves equal to their
deposit liabilities.4 0 Other rules require that a specified portion of a regulated
issuer's assets be highly liquid. 4
Activity/Affiliation Restrictions: Structural measures can be used in
addition to, or in lieu of, balance sheet regulation, to help insulate firms that
36. See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, The Soundness of FinancialIntermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1, 55
(1976); HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS, REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
(1999); KENNETH SPONG, BANKING REGULATION ITS PURPOSES, IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS

6 et seq. (5th ed. 2000).
37. Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 allows some money market mutual funds
to report their daily net asset value, that is, the total value of their securities holdings divided by the
number of shares outstanding, at a fixed price, so long as the market value of these securities does
not deviate from the reported amount by more than a small amount. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2015).
This is a condition of issuing shares valued at par and redeemable on demand, a defining feature of
money market mutual funds. See Jill Fisch & Eric D. Roiter, A Floating NA Vfor Money Market
Funds: Fix or Fantasy?, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1003 (2012); see also infra Part III.B.3.
38. For example, banks' scope to invest in equities and real estate is very specifically prescribed.
See Decisions on Bank Applications, Investments & Activities, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/bankdecisions/InvestActivity/ (last updated July 25, 2012);
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, ACTIVITIES PERMISSIBLE FOR A NATIONAL BANK,

CUMULATIVE (2011), http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publicationsreports/bankact.pdf. The Volcker Rule is a recent example of constraints on banking holding
company investments in hedge funds. See Scott Patterson & Ryan Tracy, Fed Gives Banks More
Time to Sell Private-Equity, Hedge-Fund Stakes, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 18, 2014, 9:45 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-gives-banks-more-time-to-sell-private-equity-hedge-fund-stakes1418933398.
39. See, e.g., National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2012) (limiting the activities of U.S.
banks); Valentine V. Craig, Merchant Banking: Past and Present, FDIC BANKING REV., Fall 2001,
at 29, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2001sep/br200lvl4nl.pdf (explaining the
historical development of restrictions on commercial banks' merchant banking activities). See also
infra Part III.B.2.
40. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Safe Banking, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2532703.
41. See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III:
THE LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO AND LIQUIDITY RISK MONITORING TOOLS (2013),

http://www.bis.org/publlbcbs238.pdf.
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issue safe assets from risks elsewhere in the financial system. Closely related
to investment restrictions, laws, regulations, and supervisory actions bar such
firms from engaging in certain activities, such as trading securities, dealing
in derivatives, or investing in hedge funds. They also proscribe or constrain
affiliations and limit transactions with certain counterparties out of concern
that risk-taking by affiliates and counterparties might infect protected firms.42
2. Outputs: Reordering Liabilities
As with private ordering, other safety and soundness rules operate on the
liability side of an issuer's balance sheet. These regulations parallel private
ordering by mandating a capital structure for issuers to protect their seniormost debts-the safe assets. However, public ordering can hardwire this
senior-subordinated hierarchy to an extent that private contracting cannot.
Legislation secures the privileged status of bank deposits (depositor
preference) in a growing number of countries. 43 When a bank fails, depositors
42. These can either "ring-fence" traditional banking activities within a financial conglomerate
(the prevailing approach in the United Kingdom and continental Europe) or separate the banking
group from other parts of the financial system (as in the United States). See, e.g., Joint Press Release,
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. et al., Agencies Issue Final Rules Implementing the
Volcker
Rule
(Dec.
10,
2013),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bereg/20131210a.htm (stating that the final
Volcker rule "impose[s] limits on banking entities' investments in, and other relationships with,

hedge funds or private equity funds"); U.K.
RECOMMENDATIONS

INDEP. COMM'N ON BANKING, FINAL REPORT
35-75
(2011),

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20131003105424/https:/hmtsanctions.s3.amazonaws.co

m/ICB%20final%20report/ICB%252OFinal%252OReport%5BI %5D.pdf;

ERKKI LIlKANEN ET AL.,
HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON REFORMING THE STRUCTURE OF THE EU BANKING SECTOR, at i

&

(2012),
http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/bank/docs/high-levelexpert group/report en.pdf
("The Group's conclusion is that it is necessary to require legal separation of certain particularly
risky financial activities from deposit-taking banks within a banking group."); Loi 2013-672 du 26
juillet 2013 de s6paration et de r6gulation des activit~s bancaires [Law 2013-672 of July 26, 2013
on the Separation and Regulation of Banking Activities], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANCAISE [JO.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 27, 2013; Trennbankengesetz [German
Bank Separation Law], included in Article 2 of the Gesetz zur Abschirmung von Risiken und zur
Planung der Sanierung und Abwicklung von Kreditinstituten und Finanzgruppen [Law concerning
Separation of Risks and Restructuring and Winding-Up of Credit Institutions and Financial Groups],
July 2013, BGBL. I Nr. 47, 3090; Jos6 Vifials et al., Creating a Safer FinancialSystem: Will the
Volcker, Vickers, and Liikanen StructuralMeasures Help? (IMF, Staff Discussion Note No. 13/4,
2013), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2013/sdnl304.pdf;
Leonardo Gambacorta
Adrian van Rixtel, Structural Bank Regulation Initiatives: Approaches and Implications 22 (Bank
of Int'l Settlements, Working Papers No. 412, 2013), http://www.bis.org/publ/work412.pdf.
Structural reform as a regulatory technique is not new; it was used to insulate deposit-taking banks
since the nineteenth-century, and most prominently to separate commercial banking from other
financial activities in the Banking Act of 1933 (or the Glass-Steagall Act) in the United States. See
Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). Structural separation is also used to
protect claims by contract and regulation outside banking, among other areas, in asset securitization.
See Gelpern and Levitin, supra note 18; John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A
Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228 (2014) (discussing
investment fund regulation).
43. See, e.g., Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act, 2013, c. 33, § 13 (UK) (introducing and
enacting legislation on depositor preference in U.K.); Press Release, Council of the European
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are first in line to be paid. Capital adequacy regulations mandate a minimum
cushion of residual equity and near-equity (capital) to absorb losses, so that
deposits are repaid in full even when an issuer is in distress."
Statutes and regulations prescribe the terms of debt contracts, contracting
procedures, and repayment priorities and shield some claims from
restructuring in bankruptcy. They work alongside private law techniques to
reduce risk in contracts that serve as safe assets.45
Statutory priorities support payoff even when the issuer is insolvent, by
putting some claims ahead of others in the distribution line. When a debtor is
liquidated, claims with absolute priority are paid in full before those behind
them get anything.4 6 Priority claims may be specified in statutes, as in the
example of bank deposits cited earlier. Alternatively, bankruptcy laws may
honor contractual commitments to pay some claims before others." Priorities
minimize credit, but not liquidity risk, since senior claims can be tied up in
bankruptcy or resolution proceedings for a long time."
Union,
Council
Agrees
Position
on
Bank
Resolution
(June
27,
2013),
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms-data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/1 37627.pdf
(stating
that "[u]nder the Council's general approach agreed today, eligible deposits from natural persons
and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as liabilities to the European Investment
Bank, would have preference over the claims of ordinary unsecured, non-preferred creditors and
depositors from large corporations").
44. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 3, 5, 6, 208, 217, 225 (2015) (U.S. capital adequacy regulations and
Basel III implementation); BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS

AND BANKING

SYSTEMS

(2011),

http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl89.pdf;

BANK FOR

INT'L

SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK
FOR
MORE
RESILIENT
BANKS
AND
BANKING
SYSTEMS
(2014),

http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs270.pdf. Liability tiering need not accompany asset-side regulation.
For example, money market mutual fund assets are specifically prescribed by law and regulation,
while their liabilities are almost entirely equity. See Fisch & Roiter, supra note 37 at 1014-17.
45. Statutory and regulatory criteria for debtors' ability to repay, loan-to-value or debt-toincome ratios, due diligence standards, and (less commonly) constraints on the financial terms of
the loans aim to reduce the risk of default on consumer loans. In doing so, they also support the
performance of securitization contracts that repackage these loans. Contract and transactional
techniques discussed in Part II supra combine with consumer protection and balance sheet
regulation to protect payoff in securitization. For a discussion of consumer protection regulation
reinforcing prudential regulations, see Erik F. Gerding, The Subprime Crisis and the Link between
Consumer FinancialProtectionand Systemic Risk, 5 FLA. INT'L U. L. REV. 93 (2009).
46. See also II U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012) (providing that, in general, if a class of unsecured
creditors rejects a debtor's reorganization plan and is not paid in full, junior creditors and equity
interest holders may not receive or retain any property under the plan).
47. For example, subordination agreements are enforceable in bankruptcy the same way as they
would be in nonbankruptcy contexts. See I I U.S.C. § 510.
48. See, e.g., id. § 507 (listing claims in order of priority); id. § 364 (providing that a party who
provides post-petition financing to a debtor may negotiate a "superpriority"). See also Dewsnup v.
Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (involving a prolonged adversary proceeding to determine validity and
extent of note and trust deed held on debtors' real property); Edward R. Morrison et al., Rolling
Back the Repo Safe Harbors,69 BUS. LAW. 1015 (2014); Dang et al., supra note 6. The example of
depositor preference illustrates how repayment priority fits in the range of interventions to make
assets safe. In the first instance, balance sheet regulation is supposed to prevent default. Central
banks backstop balance sheet regulation with liquidity support-deposit insurance pays out when
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Aptly named bankruptcy "safe harbors" offer even stronger protections
for eligible contracts. Unlike priorities, safe harbors address both credit and
liquidity risks. In the United States, safe harbored contracts, such as repos
and derivatives, escape the automatic stay on creditor enforcement, rules
against setoff, and rules against preferential transfers to creditors.49 They are
"effectively exempt from bankruptcy."so For example, while other secured
creditors must petition the court to access their collateral, repo lenders can
sell it immediately;5 ' they can also accelerate and terminate their contracts
and set off the value of their claims on the bankruptcy estate against their
obligations to it.52 This special treatment encourages more capital to flow into
repo markets, which enhances their liquidity.
3.

Investor Contracts and Secondary Markets

A third set of regulatory tools safeguards safe asset markets by regulating
the contracts investors use to buy safe assets from the issuer in primary
markets and from one another in secondary trading. By governing the
leverage of investors and their potential default, these rules enhance the
liquidity of safe asset markets, a crucial feature of "safety." As we discussed
the bank must be closed. Depositor preference comes into play if deposit insurance is not enough.
See Daniel C. Hardy, Bank Resolution Costs, DepositorPreference and Asset Encumbrance, 22 J.
FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 96 (2014).
49. See Morrison et al., supra note 48.
50. Arguments for and against safe harbors for various financial contracts are reviewed in
Stephen J. Lubben, Transaction Simplicity, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 194 (2012); DAVID
SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS
(UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 135 (2011); Chrystin Ondersma, Shadow Banking and Financial
Distress,2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 79 (2013). For a discussion of repos, see Morrison et al., supra
note 48, at 7. In a more passive way, the law can support repayment by leaving space for
"bankruptcy-remote" securitization trusts, formed to shield trust assets from restructuring in
bankruptcy. See Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial
Regulation to Risk Models and the GlobalFinancialCrisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127 (2009). Although
bankruptcy remoteness may improve the prospects of repayment for securitization claims when the
underlying assets are performing in line with expectations, it acts as a structural impediment to
mortgage modification and can amplify distress in bad states of the world. See Gelpern & Levitin,
supra note 18, at 1077.
51. In a repo transaction, one party sells a security to another and agrees to buy it back for a
higher price at a future date. This is functionally equivalent to a loan by the buyer to the seller in
the amount of the sale price, with the security acting as collateral. The difference between the sale
and repurchase prices reflects implicit interest on the loan. The sale price is typically less than the
market price of the security;.as a result, the loan is effectively over-collateralized at the outset. The
amount of over-collateralization, or the difference between the sale price and the market price of
the security, is referred to as a "haircut." It is akin to debtor equity in the transaction. Buyers
(lenders) demand a larger haircut (more collateral) when they worry about the risk of repayment or
a decline in collateral value.
52. In bilateral repos, sellers (borrowers) and buyers (lenders) deal with each other directly. In
tri-party repos, agents intermediate between them, stand ready to substitute collateral, and, in some
cases, provide intraday financing. As of January 2014, the U.S. repo-market stood at just over $3
trillion, with tri-party and bilateral repos each representing approximately $1.4 trillion. In the U.S.
market, most bilateral repos use U.S. Treasury debt as collateral and most tri-party repos use other
assets. See Morrison et al., supra note 48, at 1023.
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briefly in Part II.D, private intermediaries can set up exchanges and clearing
companies to create more liquid markets. Those private institutions are
heavily regulated by the state. In some cases, statutes and regulations push
assets to be traded and cleared using these regulated platforms. 3 Exchanges
and clearing companies (i.e., regulated institutions that mutualize
counterparty risk), as we explain below, function less like private markets
and more like regulated utilities. 54
These regulations stem from the perceived benefits of exchange trading
and clearing for safe assets and other financial instruments.55 For example,
central clearing requirements try to mitigate counterparty risk in financial
contracts. A clearing company, acting as a central counterparty, stands
between two sides in a financial contract, reducing the risk that one of them
might fail without performing its side of the bargain.5 6 In 2008, traders in
derivatives markets, among others, feared that their contract counterparties
might fail. As a result, their individual efforts to manage the risk by
demanding more collateral led to panic sales and more failures. 57 In response,
world leaders agreed in 2009 to require previously unregulated derivatives
contracts to be centrally cleared." The United States and other jurisdictions
have since legislated and regulated to implement these reforms.59
Margin and collateral requirements are analogous to minimum capital
standards in balance sheet regulation, except that they apply to contracts
rather than institutions. Brokers, exchanges, and regulators have long
required margins when buying a security with borrowed funds.o Similarly,

53. The Dodd-Frank Act creates mechanisms to regulate certain exchanges and clearing
companies as financial market utilities. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 805-807, 124 Stat. 1376, 1809-1815
(2010) (codified, respectively, at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5464-5466 (2012)); see also Dodd-FrankAct, U.S.
COMMODITY

AND

FUTURES

TRADING

COMM'N,

http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/index.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2016).
54. Dodd Frank Act, §§ 805-807, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5464-5466.

55. Id.
56. A common objection to this requirement is that it replaces the risk of bilateral counterparty
failure with the risk of clearing companies' failure. The rich debate over the merits of central
clearing is beyond the scope of this Article; we simply identify clearing requirements as an example
of state intervention to ensure payoff for particular contracts. See Adam J. Levitin, The Tenuous
Casefor Derivatives Clearinghouses, 101 GEO. L.J. 445 (2013); Adam J. Levitin, Prioritization
and Mutualization: Clearinghouses and the Redundancy of the Bankruptcy Safe Harbors, 10
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 129 (2015); Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of
Clearinghousesin Complex Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387 (2013). While clearing companies are an
old device, regulations mandating that traders use them are new.
57. See, e.g., Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15223, 2009).
58. G20, LEADERS' STATEMENT: THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT SEPTEMBER 24 - 25 2009, at 9
(2009), https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/PittsburghDeclaration 0.pdf.
59. Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 761-774 (2010); FIN. STABILITY BD., OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET
REFORMS:

EIGHTH

PROGRESS

REPORT

ON

IMPLEMENTATION

http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r1 I41107.pdf.?pagemoved=1.
60. ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 379(2014).

(2014),
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the practice of over-collateralization (haircuts) is prevalent in securitiesbased lending markets, such as repos. Post-2008 regulatory reform proposals
advocate minimum haircut levels for contracts that do not clear through
clearing companies.6 ' In this way, collateral requirements serve both as a
standalone tool to mitigate risk, and as an incentive to move contracts to
central clearing. 2
This third type of regulation shades into the next set of regulatory tools,
namely "labels" that create incentives for investors to purchase safe assets
and send signals that these debt contracts may be treated as low risk.
B. LABELING

In Part II.B, we describe private ordering that labels assets as safe. Credit
rating agencies provide information to investors on the riskiness of issuers
and safe assets. They also provide a coordination device for investors to herd
into the same markets and generate liquidity. Rating agencies may once have
been more purely market-based institutions. However, since the 1970s,
policymakers have woven rating agency ratings into a vast array of prudential
banking, insurance, and other financial regulations.
Many regulated
financial institutions can only purchase "investment-grade" debt instruments,
that is, the debt must have one of the highest ratings issued by a credit rating
agency.64 Moreover, regulations specify that only certain rating agencies can
provide this certification, those that are registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.6 ' Ratings have thus morphed from a tool of private
ordering into one thoroughly embedded within, and promoted by, regulation.
Indeed, scholars such as Frank Partnoy have argued that such public
intervention endows rating agencies with "regulatory licenses." 66 Even if
regulated institutional investors care little about the information content of
the ratings they give, rating agencies serve as the gate that restricts their
access or directs them to certain investment markets.

61. FIN. STABILITY BD., STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF SHADOW
BANKING: REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR HAIRCUTS ON NON-CENTRALLY CLEARED
SECURITIES FIN. TRANSACTIONS, at i (2014), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wpcontent/uploads/r_141013a.pdf. Contracts secured by government debt would be exempt. See also
Gorton & Metrick, supra note 57.
62. See Erik F. Gerding, Credit Derivatives, Leverage, and FinancialRegulation s Missing
Macroeconomic Dimension, 8 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 29 (2011) (outlining multiple roles of margin
requirements for derivatives).
63. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, How and Why CreditAgencies are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, in
FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS (Yasuyki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan,

eds. 2006); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of FinancialMarkets: Two Thumbs Down for the
Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 692-93 (1999) [hereinafter Partnoy, Credit Rating
Agencies].
64. See Partnoy, Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 63.
65. Id. at 691-92.

66. Id. at 698.
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Regulatory labels can take other more complex forms beyond ratings. As
we discuss below, a variety of laws and regulations make authoritative public
statements about the government's perception of the riskiness of particular
investments. These regulations can also push and pull investors into certain
investments and generate demand for safe assets. These rules may obviate
some or all of market-based price discovery; in this way, labels promote
information insensitivity. We describe three distinct kinds of labels: investor
licenses (or permissions); regulatory tax breaks for certain investment
classes; and regulatory prices. We trace how these various labels operate in
a highly discontinuous fashion. If regulations that "make" assets safer
typically work as incremental dials, labels function as switches. In other
words, assets either qualify for a label or they do not, and they can earn and
lose their labels abruptly.
1.

Label as Investor License

When a regulated firm may hold only a limited menu of assets, the
inclusion of a particular asset in the menu works as a safety label and a license
to invest (safe for banks). Some regulations specify permitted investments by
name, as, for example, in the "legal lists" of bank investments published by
state regulators in the United States."7 Others describe asset attributes. For
instance, some state laws limit banks, municipalities, and insurance firms to
investments with stable net asset values (NAV). 68 Exemptions operate as a
version of licensing: U.S. government debt is exempt from prohibitions on
affiliate transactions and proprietary trading under U.S. banking law; 69
European government debt is exempt from concentration limits under
European Union bank regulations.7 0
67. See, e.g., COMM'R OF BANKS, LIST OF LEGAL INVESTMENTS, COMMONWEALTH OF MASS.

(2015),

http://www.mass.gov/ocabr/banking-and-finance/laws-and-regulations/list-of-legal-

investments.html (listing investment deemed "legal" under MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 167, § 15A
(2015)); see also W. BRADDOCK HICKMAN, CORPORATE BOND QUALITY AND INVESTOR
EXPERIENCE 211-78 (1957) (on the performance of bonds on "Legal Lists").
68. INv. Co. INST., REPORT OF THE MONEY MARKET WORKING GROUP 27-28, app. D at 13339 (2009) [hereinafter ICI], https://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr 09_mmwg.pdf ("Many state laws and
regulations also authorize municipalities, insurance companies, and other state regulated entities to
invest in stable NAV funds, sometimes explicitly including funds operating in compliance with Rule
2a-7. Thus, under a floating NAV, most state and local governments would no longer be able to use
money market funds to help manage their cash."). See also Perspectiveson Money Market Mutual
Fund Rejorms: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affiirs, 112th Cong.
29-30 (2012) (testimony of Paul Schott Stevens, President and CEO, Investment Company
Institute), https://www.ici.org/govaffairs/fin srv/mmf/ 2_senate jss mmforal.
69. The proprietary trading exemption also applies to some non-U.S. government debt under a
limited set of circumstances. See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain
Interests in, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 5,536
(Jan. 31, 2014) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.44 (OCC); 12 C.F.R. pt. 248 (Fed. Reserve); 12 C.F.R. pt.
351 (FDIC); 17 C.F.R. pt. 255 (SEC)).
70. Capital Requirements Regulation 575/2013, arts. 400(2)(g)-(h), 2013 O.J. (L176) (EU);
PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTHORITY, BANK OF ENGLAND, SUPERVISORY STATEMENT 16/13,
LARGE EXPOSURES (2013).
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Label-as-investor-license does not call an asset risk free-only safe
enough to buy." By extension, label-as-investor-license does not dispense
with the need for regulated firms to research the risk attributes of an asset; it
just gets them over a regulatory threshold. As we note in Part II.B, ratings
might help investors conserve information gathering costs. This assumes that
investors look to labels for their information content, rather than as permits
to allow them to invest in what they otherwise would not. For governments,
labels can help coordinate regulated firms to invest in a limited set of known
assets and reduce monitoring costs in balance sheet regulation. Licensing
works as an on-off switch, potentially creating a market for an asset where
there was none. Other forms of labeling do similar work in a subtler way.
2.

Label as Regulatory Tax Break for Investors

Risk weights in capital adequacy regulation operate to impose different
effective regulatory tax rates on different classes of assets. We described
regulatory capital earlier as a mandatory cushion of residual liabilities, first
in line to absorb losses when assets fail to pay as expected. To determine the
minimum level of capital required, the assets of a regulated firm are
"weighted," or adjusted for risk. If a corporate loan is weighted at 100% and
a residential mortgage loan in the same amount is weighted at 50%, the first
loan takes twice as much minimum capital as the second. Zero-risk assets
have no minimum capital requirements.72 To the extent a firm pays more to
issue capital compared to other liabilities, it pays more for assets with
higher risk weights. The firm is discouraged, but not barred, from buying
such assets. Where capital requirements operate as regulatory taxes, the lower
capital requirements for safe asset classes operate as tax breaks. Lower
regulatory taxes encourage investors to herd into lower risk weight markets. 74
Risk weights, like licenses, also convey information about government
assessments of risk. Regardless of whether they work through changing the
cost of investments or signaling a permanently low risk, regulatory labels can
71. For example, if the institutional regulation regime insists that only "risk-free" investments
are permitted, then putting an asset on the permitted list would be tantamount to labeling it risk free.
Consider a narrow banking regime, where banks that issue deposit claims are only allowed to invest
in cash and in the debt of their chartering governments. Expanding the list of permitted investments
to housing agencies or foreign government debt, or shares in investment funds that hold a mix of
government debt and other low-risk investments, can operate as labeling all these contracts as safe,
on par with cash and government debt.
72. See RICHARD S. CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

(4th ed. 2008).
73. The magnitude of the effect and explanations for it are subject to debate. Compare ANAT
ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS' NEW CLOTHES: WHAT'S WRONG WITH BANKING
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2013), with INST. OF INT'L FIN., RISK SENSITIVITY: THE IMPORTANT

ROLE OF INTERNAL MODELS (2014), https://www.iif.com/publication/regulatory-report/risksensitivity-important-role-internal-models.
74. Cf David Jones, Emerging Problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory Capital
Arbitrageand Related Issues, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 35 (2000).
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enhance the liquidity of an asset by reassuring potential buyers that it will
have a market among regulated firms.
Like all labels, risk weights purport to recognize but not alter the
attributes of an asset. However, this is not strictly accurate. Risk weights can
be sharply discontinuous and static in a way that risk is not. The "bucket"
approach of the first-generation Basel accords divided bank assets into five
credit risk categories, or buckets, corresponding to zero, 10%, 20%, 50% and
100% risk weights depending on the nature of the issuer and the contract.75
In this early regime, national regulators did not attempt to gauge the riskiness
of particular government, bank, consumer, or corporate debt contracts, but
agreed to make their banks set aside the same minimum capital cushion for
all contracts within a specified category-no capital for the debt of European
governments, 20% for the debts of banks regulated by such governments,
50% for certain residential mortgage loans, and 100% for most corporate
debt.7 6 Unless regulators chose to demand above-minimum capital, the
"capital tax" on a loan to Coca-Cola under the bucket approach might be the
same as that on a loan to a start-up in the neighbor's garage, and would
remain the same as a start-up turned into Apple or Google. Such risk
weighting does not, and cannot, reflect particular asset risk; it can, however,
create incentives for banks to lend to the riskiest borrowers within a bucket,
which would pay higher interest rates.
3. Label as Regulatory Price
Regulatory accounting rules apply to safe asset issuers, but communicate
to safe asset buyers. For example, as already noted, U.S. securities
regulations have long permitted money market mutual funds to quote their
shares at a stable NAV, typically $1 per share, provided the market value of
their assets (shadow NAV) stayed close to the quoted value.77 Stable NAV
effectively tells buyers of money market fund shares to treat them as if they
are guaranteed repayment at par; it makes them more "money-like."" Some
sophisticated institutional investors derive additional regulatory and
accounting benefits from holding fund shares with stable accounting value:
banks and other institutions whose investment options are limited by law are
specifically permitted to hold shares of money market funds and treat them
75. BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 8 (1988),

http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsO4a.pdf.
76. Id. at 21-22.
77. The use of stable NAV was limited, but not eliminated, in post-crisis regulatory reform. See
17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2014); Market Fund Reform, Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47,736
(Aug. 14, 2014) (amending 17 C.F.R. 230, 239, 270, 274, 279).
78. See, e.g., Arvind Krishnamurthy & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, The Aggregate Demandfor
Treasury Debt, 120 J. POL. EcON. 233 (2012); Robin M. Greenwood et al., A ComparativeAdvantage Approach to Government Debt Maturity 4-5 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No.
1680604, 2012), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1680604.
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as if they were cash, so long as the accounting value of the fund shares
remains fixed.79
A fixed regulatory value, such as $1 per share for money market mutual
funds, comes closest to declaring an asset to be safe. The $1 label tells
investors that there would be no deviation in payoff and instructs investors to
act accordingly. In contrast, while zero-risk weighting in capital adequacy
regulations might imply total safety, its stated function is to tell regulated
investors that they need not hold regulatory capital against the asset.
4. Labeled Safe: Conclusions
Labeling in all its forms can improve the liquidity of an asset, but it does
not make the issuer more creditworthy or payoff more certain. Labels can
serve as coordinating devices, herding investors into a limited range of assets.
As such, labels tend to be discontinuous. "Zero-risk" and "$1 per share" are
extreme examples that illustrate a broader point: a few stark labels convey
clear messages. Such labels are, however, simpler to administer and make
better focal points for coordination than labels reflecting fine risk
gradations.so Related, labels can authoritatively deem an asset to be
absolutely safe, not just a bit safer.
Additionally, regulatory labels can save investors the costs of
independent risk assessment, provided regulators have access to better
information about the asset in question, or can do a better job evaluating it.
These qualifiers are significant: public authorities are unlikely to have
superior information about financial assets in general, apart from their own
debt and claims issued by the firms they regulate. Thus, information
advantage cannot fully explain why market participants would embrace
public labels.
C. GUARANTEES
On the other hand, govemments do have superior tools to ensure the
safety of any given asset. Public backing for safe assets can take the form of
credit and liquidity guarantees. It may be explicit or implicit, direct or
indirect, ex ante or ex post. The law sets the terms of the explicit guarantees
and creates the space for the implicit ones. This public tool also has a private
analogue in the third party guarantees and other credit enhancement
described in Part II.C. However, government guarantees are more powerful
than private ones by virtue of the sovereign's unique fiscal, monetary, and
police powers. We describe several key permutations of government
guarantees below.
79. See ICI, supra note 68.
80. See generally Robert Ahdieh, Imperfect Alternatives: Networks, Salience, and Institutional
Design in Financial Crisis, 79 U. CIN. L. REv. 527 (2011); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY
OF CONFLICT 57-58 (1960).
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Credit Guarantees

Credit guarantees commit fiscal resources to the safety of private
contracts. A full and unconditional credit guarantee effectively turns a private
contract into government debt. Conversely, partial and conditional
guarantees may involve substantial uncertainty about coverage, and do little
to boost asset safety. Public rescues that are not specified and priced in
advance as guarantees can fuel excess risk-taking because of the expectation
of future bailouts. On the other hand, guarantee terms spelled out ahead of
time may not stick in a financial crisis.
Bank deposit insurance is one example of public backing for a category
of safe assets (consumer deposits). It attaches to certain contracts (deposits),
but also helps support the issuing institution by discouraging creditors from
running. Government guarantees of full repayment render deposits "defaultfree" in the eyes of the public."' The state may finance the guarantee directly,
or make it available as a contingent backstop, when some combination of
bank equity, junior debt, affiliate contributions, and industry financing fall
short.82 From a depositor's perspective, the precise mix of funding for
guarantees is unimportant so long as they are paid in full, incur no extra cost,
the state bears the residual risk, and the payout process is unaffected. For the
owners and other creditors of the bank, the terms of government participation
are all-important; entire regulatory regimes can be justified as deposit
insurance conditions."
Deposit guarantees are usually specified up front in statutes and
regulations.8 4 This commitment to pay no more and no less than the specified
guaranteed amount may fail in two situations. First, where deposit insurance
is partial and the crisis is systemic, many governments have extended
coverage ex post to more claims and claimants. Both the United Kingdom
and the United States did so out of concern for system-wide spillovers in

81. See SPONG, supra note 36, at 23. However, if payout is not immediate, the deposits become
illiquid. A combination of these factors made depositors at Northern Rock Bank in the United
Kingdom lose confidence in the safety of their deposits in September 2007. See TRIASURY
COMMiTrii. TH RUN ON THI ROCK, RliPOR Y. 2007-2008. H1C 5 (UK).
82. See, e.g., Jianping Zhou et al., From Bail-out to Bail-in: Mandatory Debt Restructuring of
2012),
Note
12/03,
Staff Discussion
(IMF,
Institutions
Systemic Financial
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2012/sdnl203.pdf; see also Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Request for Comment, Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions:
The Single Point of Entry Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 243 (Dec. 18, 2013).
83. See Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-797,64 Stat. 873 (1950) (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1835a (2012)).
84. See, e.g., Ash Demirgig-Kunt & Edward J. Kane, Deposit Insurance Around the Globe:
Where Does It Work?, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2002, at 175; Asli Demirgiiq-Kunt, Baybars
Karacaovali & Luc Laeven, Deposit Insurance Around the World: A Comprehensive Database
(World Bank, Working Paper No. 3628, 2005); FIN. STABILITY BD., THEMATIC REVIEW ON
(2012),
SYSTEMS
INSURANCE
DEPOSIT
http://www.financialstabiIityboard.org/publications/rI20208.pdf.
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2007 and 2008, respectively." At the other extreme, a government may lack
the resources or the political capacity to honor the original guarantee, and
may curtail coverage or choose among the claimants in crisis. When Iceland's
underfunded deposit insurance scheme ran out of money in the crisis of 2008,
it paid its residents ahead of United Kingdom and Dutch depositors in
Icelandic banks; Iceland's decision was upheld by the European Free Trade
Area court.
The ubiquitous pejorative "bailouts" refers to government payments on
implicit credit guarantees. National champions, too-big-to-fail financial
firms, political subdivisions, and other entities whose failure would be
macro-economically or politically intolerable are the usual beneficiaries.
Implicit guarantees-not specified in law, regulation, or contract-may be
widely expected ex ante. This was the case with Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, the U.S. government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), which functioned
as substitutes for U.S. Treasury bonds for official reserve managers and
private investors before they nearly failed in 2008.7 Federal backing was
made explicit in the summer of 2008." Investors correctly foresaw that the
85. See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham et al., UK to GuaranteeNorthern Rock Deposits, FIN. TIMES (Sept.
17,
2007,
6:57
PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/39199b78-6489-I dc-90ea0000779fd2ac.html#axzz3CsFh6xOo. For the terms of U.K. deposit insurance, before the crisis, see
Deposit Limits, FINANCIAL SERVICES COMPENSATION SCHEME, http://www.fscs.org.uk/what-we-

cover/eligibility-rules/compensation-limits/deposit-limits/ ("For claims against firms declared in
default before 1 October 2007, the maximum level of compensation is £31,700 (100% of the first
£2,000 and 90% of the next E33,000).") (last visited Nov. I1, 2015). See also Temporary Liquidity
Guarantee Program, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/tlgp/
("On October 14, 2008, as part of a coordinated response by the U.S. government to the disruption
in the financial system and the collapse of credit markets, the FDIC implemented the Temporary
Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP) .... The TAGP guaranteed in full all domestic noninterestbearing transaction deposits, low-interest NOW accounts, and Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts
(IOLTAs) held at participating banks and thrifts through December 31, 2009.") (last updated Feb.
27, 2013). See generally Anna Gelperm, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493
(2009) (describing blanket ex post bank guarantees in the United Kingdom and Korea) [hereinafter
Gelpern, FinancialCrisis Containment].
86. See, e.g., Case E-16/l l, EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland (European Free Trade
Assoc. 2013) (describing how in October 2008, U.K. and Netherlands depositors of Landsbanki, an
Iceland bank, lost access to their deposits). A distinct but related example involves the bail-in of
uninsured depositors in Cyprus. On the one hand, the exclusion of insured deposits under 6100,000
conveyed their still-privileged status; on the other hand, the European Union and IMF refusal to
recognize a broader privilege for all deposits was seen as a blow to the safety of uninsured deposits.
See Banking Reform Act, 2013, c. 33, §13 (UK); IMF, Deposit Insurance Technical Note, Country
Report 7 (2013), http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/scr/2013/crl366.pdf; Peter Spiegel, Cypriot
Bank Deposits Tapped as Part of EIObn Eurozone Bailout, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2013, 5:30 AM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/33fb34b4-8df8- Ile2-9d6b-00144feabdcO.html (stating that "a
6lObn bailout of Cyprus ... included convincing Nicosia to seize 65.8bn from Cypriot bank deposits
to help pay for the rescue"); Stavros A. Zenios, Fairness and Reflexivity in the Cyprus Bail-In
(Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No. 14-04, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2409284
(arguing that the bail-in of depositors in Cyprus banking crisis violated principles of fairness).
87. See, e.g., David Reiss, The Federal Government's Implied Guaranteeof FannieMae and
Freddie Mac's Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019 (2008).
88. See WAYNE M. MORRISON & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REP. 34314,
CHINA'S HOLDINGS OF U.S. SECURITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ECONOMY (2013) ("In June
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economic and political significance of the housing finance agencies in the
U.S. economy would make their failure inconceivable. In other instances,
such as repo and asset-backed commercial paper contracts, there were no
apparent expectations or clear market consensus on implicit guarantees ex
ante.89
Government interventions in a crisis make the existence of ex post
guarantee authority apparent to the public. Government rescues may also
create expectations of bailouts for the future. While the general public may
not have been aware of implicit guarantees before the bailout (even if market
participants had expected it all along), they become cognizant of these
government guarantees hereafter. Public awareness then potentially leads to
political backlash and demands to restrict government power in a future
financial crisis.
These examples suggest that laws and regulations specifying and
delimiting government credit guarantees are poor predictors of government
behavior in crisis. With the partial exception of retail deposit insurance
(guarantees that visibly benefit consumers with premium charged to banks),
large-scale commitments of fiscal resources have been based on obscure,
open-ended, or ad-hoc legal authorities. In light of this record, ex ante
government disavowals of guarantees are unlikely to persuade buyers of
apparently safe assets.

2008, China's holdings of [long-term] U.S. Agency debt constituted 43.7% of its holding of U.S.
securities, which were greater than its holdings of [long-term] U.S. Treasury securities (43.3%).
However, the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble and the subsequent federal takeover of Freddie
Mac and Fannie Mae in 2008 led China to significantly reduce its holdings of U.S. Agency debt,
while increasing its holdings of other securities, especially Treasury securities."); N. ERIC WEISS,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REP. 22916, FANNIE MAE'S AND FREDDIE MAC'S FINANCIAL PROBLEMS:

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2008) ("The GSEs have a special relationship with the federal
government-sometimes called an implicit guarantee-that has allowed them to borrow at interest
rates only slightly above those paid by the federal government"); N. ERIC WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV. REP. 40800, GSES AND THE GOVERNMENT's ROLE IN HOUSING FINANCE: ISSUES FOR THE

113TH CONGRESS (2013) ("In September 2008, the GSEs individually agreed with their regulator,
the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), that unexpected mortgage delinquencies and
resulting losses jeopardized their solvency. The GSEs agreed to direct government control, known
as conservatorship, which is the equivalent of bankruptcy reorganization for financial companies.
As part of the agreement to conservatorship, Treasury agreed to provide financial support to keep
the GSEs solvent."). See also David J. Reiss, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Future of
FederalHousing FinancePolicy: A Study of Regulatory Privilege, 61 ALA. L. REV. 907 (2010).
89. See generally Morrison et al., supra note 48. Market expectations with respect to implicit
guarantees for systemically important too-big-to-fail firms are the subject of ongoing academic
study and public debates. See, e.g., Maureen O'Hara & Wayne Shaw, DepositInsuranceand Wealth
Effects: The Value ofBeing "Too Big to Fail",45 J. FIN. 1587 (1990) (studying the TBTF premium).
See DAVID REISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REP. 42150, SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT OR "Too BIG
To FAIL" FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2014); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-621,
LARGE BANK HOLDING COMPANIES: EXPECTATIONS OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT (2014); Special
Studies,
Too
Big
To
Fail,
FED.
RESERVE
BANK
OF
MINNEAPOLIS,

https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/studies/tbtf/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2015).
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2. Liquidity Guarantees
If market participants could replace a contract at face value with central
bank money at any time, they would certainly be justified in using that
contract as if it were risk free. Central banks have multiple powers to provide
that kind of liquidity guarantee. They can buy and sell assets as part of
monetary policy operations.90 They can also make emergency loans to
support solvent financial firms, and increasingly, asset markets. However,
central banks are not supposed to extend credit guarantees or allocate
resources, which are the province of fiscal authorities. The trouble is that the
line between liquidity and credit support is fuzzy.
Monetary policy does not normally target individual asset prices;
however, central banks do buy and sell a limited range of assets to influence
aggregate price levels. As a result, making an asset eligible for monetary
policy operations can amount to guaranteeing its liquidity. Similarly, legal
rules that define acceptable collateral against which central banks will extend
emergency loans sends a clear signal of the safety of the assets that qualify
and create a deeper, more liquid market for them.9
In the recent financial crisis, central banks became increasingly creative
in using two traditional tools of monetary policy-open market operations
and emergency loans. Central banks also became more creative in their
interpretations of the legal constraints on their monetary policy and crisis
management authority. We consider the adaptation of both tools in tum.
First, in the United States, the Federal Reserve began buying a wider
range of assets to effect a monetary policy of quantitative easing. In Europe,
the European Central Bank (ECB) bought a wide range of sovereign bonds
starting in May of 2010, with the stated goal of facilitating monetary policy
transmission. In both the United States and Europe, the line between
monetary policy and providing crisis support to failing financial
intermediaries or politically important borrowers was blurred.
There is a safe asset angle to the story: central banks found new ways to
substitute public safe assets for privately produced ones that had lost their
sheen of low risk and liquidity. Indeed, some economists argue that this
substitution and the injection of new safe assets into the economy was the
crucial piece of crisis intervention.9 2 The implications for the legal
construction of safe asset markets are similarly profound. In crises, when the
legal creativity of central banks and governments is at its height, and the rules
restricting central banks and finance ministries are at their most pliable, the
90. The range of assets used for this purpose has expanded as central banks have resorted to
unconventional monetary policies in the face of low growth and zero interest rates.
91. Collateral, EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/coll/html/index.en.
html (last visited Jan. 13, 2016); Collateral hIornation, FED. RESERVE DiSCOUNT WINDOW,
https://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/en/Pages/Collateral.aspx (last visited Jan. 13, 2016).
92. See, e.g., Gary B. Gorton & Guillermo Ordonez, The Supply and Demand of Safe Assets
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18732, 2013).
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state sends two clear signals. First, it stands ready to backstop a wider set of
assets, which might have been undefined until now. Second, going forward,
a broader range of asset markets might enjoy the safety label emanating from
government backing.
The legal creativity of central banks in crisis also extends to their
interpretation of restrictions on emergency lending. In the recent financial
crisis, the ECB and Federal Reserve interpreted their legal authority to allow
for emergency loans to a wider range of entities against a wider range of
collateral, including privately produced safe assets, such as asset-backed
securities, which had lost their safety. In this case, emergency lending had
the effect of replacing distressed debt that could no longer function as a safe
asset with new public debt that could still do so. It also signaled future
government backing for two different kinds of safe assets: the debt of banks
and other financial institutions because of newly opened access to emergency
loans, and the newly acceptable collateral that could be pledged for those
loans.
Emergency lending took new forms in the financial crisis beyond
traditional tools such as the Federal Reserve's Discount Window.93 The
Federal Reserve created complex lending facilities94 that deployed Federal
Reserve resources to support some of the safe asset issuers and markets that
had frozen in the crisis, including money market mutual funds, asset-backed
securities, and ABCP. Cutting through the byzantine financial engineering of
these facilities: a central bank was deploying super safe public assets to
support private ones, with clear signals about future government backing and
labeling of these markets. Cutting through the creative legal interpretations:
a central bank was blurring an already unclear line between liquidity and
credit guarantees.
This line between conventional central bank liquidity support and
controversial credit guarantees has proven blurry in every financial crisis."
On the other hand, both forms of public backing can be discontinuous, much
like labels. The rules that specify the scope of a guarantee can instantly turn
contracts into safe assets. The abrupt line between the saved and the damned
may be essential to the nature and uses of safe assets. However, history,
recent and longstanding, demonstrates how financial crises, market

93. See Discount Window Lending, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reformdiscount-window.htm (last updated Dec. 31,
2015); Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys. Bd. of Governors, Remarks at Cariton
University: The Federal Reserve's Policy Actions During the Financial Crisis and Lessons for
http://
2010),
13,
the Future (May
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20100513a.pdf; Credit and Liquidity Programs
and

the

Balance

Sheet,

BD.

OF

GOVERNORS

OF

THE

FED.

RESERVE

SYS.,

http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst-crisisresponse.htm (last updated June 4, 2015).
94. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012) (codifying Federal Reserve Act § 13(3)).
95. See generally Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, supra note 85.
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expectations, and market gamesmanship can create pressure on policymakers
to rewrite or reinterpret where the line must be drawn.
Each crisis, then, risks creating a chasm between winners and losers that
can become entrenched over time in expectations about asset safety. Safe
assets gather powerful constituents-people and firms with stakes in
perpetuating their safe status, which draws investors, feeds market liquidity,
and boosts asset prices. Ex post guarantees in crisis are a high-profile
reminder that some financial contracts have a special claim on public
resources quite apart from the law on the books. Broad public realization of
this fact can provoke a backlash, even as it might boost investor interest in
the beneficiary asset. Both responses risk producing long-lasting distortions.
CONCLUSION
Parts II and III address a key question left unanswered by the existing
safe asset literature: how is it that apparently savvy market participants could
possibly treat trillions of dollars in financial contracts as if they were riskfree. In the run up to the financial crisis, law played a crucial role in shaping
market expectations that certain assets involved ultra-low risk and enjoyed
ultra-high liquidity. Law played this role not only through statutes and
regulations, but also through private ordering of contracts and transactions.
Figure 4 below places the tools of private and public ordering side by side.
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Figure 4: Private Ordering
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Fi2ure 4: Public Ordering
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This list of tools is illustrative, not exhaustive. It is meant to underscore

two themes. First, none of these tools are new. Instead, we offer a new
framework for categorizing these tools.
Second, the state and the law are thoroughly embedded in safe asset
construction. There is no such thing as purely private ordering or purely
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public ordering in safe asset markets. Both are intertwined and
interdependent. Private ordering occurs against a regulatory backdrop.
Bankruptcy remoteness, which is crucial for securitization, occurs only
because legislators have written and revised the bankruptcy code to facilitate
this status. Much of the demand for securitization comes from regulations
that enable and encourage financial institutions to purchase asset-backed
securities. A significant portion of the demand for securitization may have
come from financial institutions looking to game banking and other
prudential regulation. Banks may have used safe assets to engage in
sophisticated transactions and financial engineering to avoid capital
adequacy and other regulatory requirements.
Private markets for safe assets would not exist in the form and on the
scale they do without public ordering. Alternatively, public ordering of safe
asset markets also relies on the private. Exemptions, such as bankruptcy safe
harbors and regulatory capital dispensations for apparently low-risk debt, all
make it possible for private safe assets to emerge in the space configured by
public intervention. If public ordering fails to create the space, or if private
ordering fails to respond, the universe of possible safe assets shrinks. If an
objective is to create more safe assets and deeper and more liquid safe asset
markets, governments cannot do it alone, even by creating more sovereign
debt. The laws, regulations, and government interventions described in Part
III assume that a significant share of the supply and demand for safe assets
will come from private actors. Statute, regulation, and contract-the public
and private law of safe assets-thus operate symbiotically.
Understanding this interaction and the full spectrum of public and private
law that shapes safe asset creation is vital to designing reforms of safe asset
markets. We leave policy prescriptions for other articles. However, we
underscore a deeper lesson found in both private and public ordering of safe
asset markets. Neither private nor public ordering causes risk to disappear for
good from safe asset markets or financial markets in general. They merely
move it around-at best, distributing it to those who can manage it most
effectively, obscuring it until it returns. Safe asset issuers transform risky
assets into theoretically safe ones. But, for every safe asset, more are created
to absorb the excess risk, which returns in crisis, when traditional risk
correlations and risk management techniques fail. Risky and safe assets,
public or private, will always coexist; they are two sides of the same coin.

